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THE TRANSNATIONAL REACH OF RULE 10b-5
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INTRODUCTION

Canadian directors of a Canadian corporation with American
shareholders knowingly purchase treasury shares at a price below the
fair value of those shares. Can an American shareholder maintain a
derivative action in a United States court, claiming a violation of rule
10b-5? Does a federal court's jurisdiction over the subject matter
depend upon whether the Canadian corporation's stock is traded on an
American exchange or over the counter in the United States?
A Canadian broker-dealer fraudulently induces a United States
1363
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citizen living in Canada to purchase Canadian securities on the Toronto
Stock Exchange. Is the American protected by rule 10b-5? Would the
result change if the Canadian broker-dealer were registered with the
SEC, maintained a permanent office in New York, and traded regularly
on American exchanges?
A British corporation writes to its American shareholders, fraudulently advising them not to tender their shares in response to an offer
by another British corporation. Does a United States court have subject matter jurisdiction over a suit brought under rule 10b-5 by an
American shareholder who relied upon the advice to his detriment?
Would the answer be different if agents of the British corporation had
made the misrepresentations in person in the United States?
A German and a Japanese businessman meet in New York, and
the latter fraudulently induces the former to purchase Japanese securities on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Can the German maintain an
action under rule 10b-5 in a United States court?
These hypothetical transactions may properly be labeled "transnational," for each transaction touches more than one nation in its
conduct, in its effect, or in both. In each case the involvement of some
combination of American territory, citizens, and interests is coupled
with some significant foreign dimension. Transnational securities dealings are commonplace today,' yet many of the jurisdictional questions
which they engender remain unanswered.
The securities laws themselves offer little guidance on their transnational applicability.2 In response to increasing transnational activity
in the securities field, Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission have attempted to clarify the extent to which some sections
of the securities laws apply in transnational settings.8 But the SEC
1 Foreign purchases and sales of U.S. equities in 1972 reached a record total of $26.4
billion, 17% higher than the total in 1971. MEMBERS Or THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS TO THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., RECOMM1ENDATIONS REGARDING FOREIGN AcCESS TO U.S. SECURITIES MARKETS 21 (1973).
2 Section 30(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1970),

does impose limitations on the applicability of the provisions of that Act to transactions
which are part of a securities business conducted outside the United States. For an explanation of the scope of these limitations, see text accompanying notes 109-20 infra.
3 The 1964 Amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 require virtually all
corporations with assets of more than one million dollars who are engaged in interstate
commerce, or in a business affecting interstate commerce, or whose securities are traded
by means of an instrumentality of interstate commerce, to register each class of equity
security held by more than 500 investors, unless the SEC chooses to take affirmative
action to exempt a foreign issuer. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1970).
The SEC has addressed the transnational applicability of the securities laws in several areas in which they are silent. It has exempted certain foreign issuers from the registration requirements of § 12 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1970), and the
companion reporting provisions of § 13, id. § 78m. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2 (1973), as
adopted in SEC Release No. 34-8066, [1966-67 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REPx.
ff 77,443, requires all foreign issuers of a class of securities held by 300 or more United
States residents to comply either with § 12(g) of the Exchange Act or a substitute registration requirement. Issuers more than half of whose outstanding voting securities are held
directly or indirectly by United States residents and whose businesses are either "admin-
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has not addressed the transnational reach of the most basic investor
protection provided by the securities law-rule 10b-5.4 Although the
SEC need not make its rules apply to all transactions,5 the Commission
has not exempted transnational stock deals from rule 10b-5. Nor has
the Commission issued guidelines clarifying the extent to which transnational frauds may be remedied in United States courts. The task of
filling the void has fallen exclusively on the courts.
This Comment will examine the present state of the case law on
the question of the transnational applicability of rule 10b-5, primarily
by focusing on the impact of the Second Circuit's decision in Leasco
Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell.6 It will explore the
problems faced by the courts in determining the proper reach of rule
10b-5 and evaluate the way in which the courts have dealt with those
problems. It will suggest a more comprehensive approach for the
courts to take in dealing with the complex issues involved, and will
point to the need for extrajudicial assistance in the resolution of these
issues.
istered principally in the United States" or controlled by a Board of Directors, at least
half of whom reside therein, must, with minor exceptions, comply with § 12(g). Almost
all other private foreign issuers have the choice of complying with § 12(g) or the more
liberal requirement of the first clause of ff (b) of the regulation mentioned above.
17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-3 (1973) exempts certain foreign issuers from the proxy provisions of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970), and the Act's insider trading provisions, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1970).
The SEC has taken the position that a foreign nonresident broker-dealer who transacts business through the use of the U.S. mails or other facilities of interstate commerce
comes within the registration requirement of § 15(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(a) (1970). 2 L. Loss, SECURITIS REGULATION 1291-92 n.15 (2d ed. 1961).
The SEC has clarified the registration requirements for foreign offerings by domestic
investors. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-4708 (July 9, 1964), in 1 CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. ffl 1361-1363. See generally U.S. PRESIDENT'S TAsk FORCE ON PROMOTING FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN UNITED STATES CORPORATE SECURITIES AND INCREASED FOREIGN FINANCING

FOR UNITED STATES CORPORATIONS OPERATING ABROAD, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES (1964) [hereinafter cited as PROMOTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT].
The Commission has exempted from the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a (1970), certain subsidiaries of American corporations organized primarily for the
purpose of financing the foreign operations of their parent organizations through the sale
of securities to foreign investors. SEC Rule 6c-1, 17 C.F.R. 270-6c-1 (1973).
The Commission has issued staff guidelines concerning the applicability of the Securities Act of 1933, the Exchange Act and the Investment Company Act to the offer and
sale of registered open-end investment companies outside the U.S. SEC Securities Act
Release No. 4951, [1967-69 Transfer Binder) CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ff 77,671.
The SEC staff has taken the position that rule 10b-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1973),
which defines as manipulative, purchases by certain persons of securities when securities
of the same class are being distributed, is violated even if the purchases are made in a
foreign market. Committee on the Securities Regulation, Japan Securities Research Institute, Seminar on the Securities Regulation: Answers from Professor Robert H. Mundheim 19-21 (Sept. 1972). That general position is subject to exceptions. For example, the
Commission has exempted from the purview of rule 10b-6 certain European underwriters
participating in registered secondary offerings outside the United States. S.S. Kresge &
Co., [1972-73 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1[78,805 (May 14, 1972).
4 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973).
5 See, e.g., 17 C.R. §§ 240.10b-6(d), 240.10b-7(n).
6468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
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II.

Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell

The gist of Leasco's complaint was that the defendants conspired
to cause it to purchase stock of Pergamon Press Limited, a British
corporation, at a price in excess of its true value. The facts, as alleged
by Leasco and adopted by the Second Circuit for the limited purpose
of its ruling,7 are as follows.
In early 1969, Robert Maxwell, a British citizen and the controlling shareholder in Pergamon, came to the headquarters of Leasco,
an American corporation, in Great Neck, New York, and proposed to
the chairman of Leasco that Pergamon and Leasco engage in a joint
venture in Europe. Maxwell falsely stated that Pergamon had a
computerized type-setting plant in Ireland and gave Leasco the most
recent Pergamon annual report, which contained false and misleading
statements of Pergamon's affairs. Later Leasco telephoned Maxwell
in London to decline the joint venture, and Maxwell invited Leasco to
England to discuss other areas of possible cooperation.8
The next meeting between Maxwell and representatives of Leasco
took place in London in April of 1969. Maxwell proposed that Pergamon purchase Leasco's European operations. Leasco's reply was that
it was only interested in acquiring Pergamon and its related companies. During the course of this meeting, Maxwell and Clark, a
director of Pergamon, whetted Leasco's interest by making exaggerated
and misleading statements of Pergamon's performance and prospects.'
The scene then shifted to New York where, in the early days of
May, Leasco's director of corporate planning met with one Majhtenyi,
an official of an American subsidiary of Pergamon. Again the meeting
was characterized by false statements concerning the profitability of
Pergamon's operations. Telephone calls from Maxwell to Leasco confirmed the glowing reports. Shortly thereafter Maxwell himself came
to New York and met with a Leasco director in a hotel room, where
further misrepresentations about the sales and earnings of Pergamon
were made. Upon his return to London, Maxwell mailed to Leasco a
letter containing a dozen documents, among which were a draft of
the 1968 Pergamon annual report (containing false statement of
profits) and a misleading report on Pergamon's financial affairs.' °
Representatives of Leasco traveled to England around May 30
and met with Maxwell and other directors of Pergamon. Misrepresentation again was the order of the day. These meetings were followed by
telephone conversations between Maxwell in London and Leasco's
7 The Second Circuit properly noted that the issue of subject matter jurisdiction
persists throughout the trial, and that if Leasco's allegations proved false, the jurisdictional principles announced in its opinion should be applied to the proven facts.
8 Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1330-31 (2d Cir.
1972).

9Id. at 1331.
10 Id.
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chairman in New York, in which Maxwell made further false statements, particularly with respect to Pergamon's profits from the sale
of back issues. 1
In June 1969, Maxwell returned to the United States to continue negotiations. After Maxwell made more misrepresentations in
New York, an agreement was signed there on June 17, 1969. By the
terms of the agreement, Leasco was to buy Maxwell's Pergamon stock
directly and to acquire the publicly held Pergamon stock by means
of a tender offer to be made by a wholly owned subsidiary. The
2
closing of the agreement was to take place in London.1
Leasco officials accompanied Maxwell back to England, where
Maxwell advised them that it would be in Leasco's interest to purchase
Pergamon stock on the open market as soon as possible. Later in June,
Maxwell called Leasco in New York, advising it to purchase Pergamon
stock on the open market to prevent a rumored countertakeover bid.
On June 20, Leasco, acting through a London banking firm, began
buying Pergamon shares on the London Stock Exchange. By July 24,
it had purchased 5,206,210 such shares, expending some $22,000,000;
the stock was paid for with cash furnished by a wholly-owned subsidiary, Leasco International N.V., a Netherlands Antilles corporation.13
Leasco subsequently learned that 600,000 of these shares had
been secretly sold by one or more of the defendants. In August, Leasco
was provided with data indicating that previous representations concerning sales of back issues of Pergamon had been misleading. Sensing
fraud, Leasco declined to go forward with the tender offer. However,
it was left with $22,000,000 of Pergamon stock acquired on the London
Stock Exchange.'
Characterizing the actual purchases as transactions among foreigners, on a foreign exchange, in foreign securities not traded in
American markets, Maxwell and his codefendants asserted .lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.'3 District Court Judge Ryan viewed the
entire series of negotiations, the June 17 agreement signed in New
York, and the subsequent purchase of Pergamon shares as a single,
continuing transaction. He held that subject matter jurisdiction existed
on the basis of the defendants' conduct within the United States and
the foreseeable impact of the transaction upon Leasco's value.' Judge
Ryan did not state these bases as alternative holdings, but portions of
his opinion suggested that the impact on Leasco stock alone was
11Id.
12 Id. at 1332.

13Id.
14 Id. at 1333.
15 Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, [1971-72 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. ff 93,454, at 92,246-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
16 Id. at 92,243-44.
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sufficient for jurisdiction, regardless of the existence of any conduct
within the United States. 7
On appeal the Second Circuit affirmed subject matter jurisdiction
on the basis of substantial conduct within the United States." But
in dicta the appellate court strongly suggested that the adverse effects
on Leasco were not sufficient to establish jurisdiction in the absence of
illegal conduct within the United States. 9 While Judge Friendly,
writing for the court, did not attempt to develop a general rule for
the transnational applicability of rule lOb-5, he did, through a set of
hypotheticals, stake out the parameters of the problem, from which
this Comment will attempt a formulation of the principles guiding the
transnational reach of rule 10b-5.
III.

PRESENT GUIDELINES

FOR THE

APPLICABILITY OF

TRANSNATIONAL

RULE 10b-5

A. Underlying Principles of International Law
The fundamental basis of a state's jurisdiction is territorial: a
state has jurisdiction to prescribe rules governing conduct within its
territory. 0 However, there are a number of additional bases of jurisdiction, which enjoy varying degrees of acceptance.
First, the objective territorial principle-an expansion of the
territorial principle-provides that a nation may regulate conduct

which occurs outside its territory and produces an effect within its
territory.2 This principle is generally accepted,22 although the precise
formulation of the principle varies among states.
Second, under the nationality principle a state has jurisdiction
over the conduct of its citizens, even if that conduct occurs outside its
2
boundariesY.
The nationality principle is universally accepted by

members of the international community, but the extent to which it
is used varies widely in the different national legal systems.24
Third, under the passive personality principle a state may exert

jurisdiction over conduct which injures one of its citizens. This doc17See id. at 92,248.

18468 F.2d 1326, 1333-39.

191d.
at 1334.
20

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

or FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §§

10(a), 17(a) (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SEcON)]; Research in International Law: Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 Am. J. IsrT'L L. 435, 445, 480-84
(Supp. 1935) [hereinafter cited as Research in InternationalLaw].
21
RsTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 20, § 18 (the Restatement does not employ
the term "objective territorial") ; Research in InternationalLaw, supra note 20, at 487-88;
The Committee on International Law, The 1964 Amendments to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and the Proposed Securities and Exchange Commission Rules, 21 RECORD OF
N.Y.C.B-A. 240, 245-46 (1966) [hereinafter cited as RECORD Or N.Y.C.B.A..
22 See Research in InternationalLaw, supra note 20,
28 RE TATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 20, § 30;

at 487-94.
Research in International Law,

supra
note 20, at 445, 519.
24
Research in InternationalLaw, supra note 20, at 445, 519-35.
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trine is asserted in some form by a number of states and rejected by
others, 5 including the United States.26
Fourth, the protective principle, claimed by most states, gives a
state jurisdiction to prescribe rules attaching legal consequences to
conduct that threatens its national security or the operation of government functions.2 7
Fifth, under the universality principle the nation that has
custody of a perso n committing an act has jurisdiction over that act.
This principle is universally accepted with respect to the crime of
piracy,2 8 and is widely accepted with respect to a limited class of other
universally recognized offenses.29
Of these five, the territorial, objective territorial, and nationality
principles are most relevant to construing the transnational reach of
section 10(b).
B. The Role of InternationalLaw and CongressionalIntent
The principles of international law outlined above define the
jurisdiction of the United States to prescribe a rule of law (prescriptive jurisdiction). Congress, however, may choose to exceed the limits
imposed on its prescriptive jurisdiction and thereby violate international law, and its enactments which do violate international law
retain their force within the United States' legal system. From the
viewpoint of the United States courts, then, the only limits upon congressional power to prescribe rules of law are those imposed by the
Constitution." As Judge Friendly explained in Leasco:
[I]f Congress has expressly prescribed a rule with respect
to conduct outside the United States, even one going beyond
the scope recognized by foreign relations law, a United States
court would be bound to follow the Congressional direction
unless this would violate the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment.3
When, therefore, a United States court is asked to apply an act
of Congress to a transnational dispute, the court must focus initially
on the express statutory language relating to the intended reach of the
act. But the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is silent on the question
25

1d. 445, 579.
The passive personality principle is not listed as an accepted jurisdictional principle in the REsTATEMNT (SECOND), supra note 20.
27 RESTATE ENT (SEcoND), supra note 20, § 33; Research in International Law,
supra note 20, at 445, 543.
28 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 20, § 34; Research in International Law,
supra note 20, at 445, 563.
29 Research in International Law, supra note 20, at 445, 573-92. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 20, § 34, Reporters' Note 2.
30 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
31468 F.2d 1334.
26
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of the transnational applicability of section 10(b). In the absence of
express congressional direction, the principles of international law
operate as a limitation upon the scope of section 10(b), for it is a
fundamental canon of statutory interpretation that "an act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any
other possible construction remains."3
In short, the jurisdictional principles of international law restrict a
United States court's freedom to apply section 10(b) in the transnational setting. The defendant who is able to demonstrate that the
facts of his case do not comport with any of these principles will
clearly defeat the invocation of jurisdiction.
But the principles of international law set only the outer limits
of section 10(b)'s transnational reach; the courts remain free to find
that Congress intended to stop short of these limits." However, the
absence of evidence of the actual intent of Congress leaves the courts
with no basis for finding that Congress intended to stop short of the
limits imposed by international law-except speculation as to what
Congress would have intended had they thought about the question.
The result is that the principles of international law function as more
than mere benchmarks. The plaintiff who is able to sift through the
complex facts of a transnational security sale and point to elements
which satisfy one or more of these principles is in a good position to
sustain his jurisdictional claim.
The court's opinion in Leasco represents, in part, an attempt to
impose limits on the reach of section 10(b) short of the boundaries
established by international law. 4 But the lack of any expressed policy
justification for the limits suggested by the court reflects the difficulties
encountered by a court which seeks to look beyond the broad guidelines provided by the principles of international law.
C. Judicial Application of Rule 10b-5 in the Transnational Setting
1. Jurisdiction Based on Acts Within the United States
Under the territorial principle, the United States has jurisdiction
to prescribe rules with respect to transactions which occur within its
territorial boundaries. However, securities transactions increasingly
fail to respect national boundaries. The purchase and sale of securities
involves a series of separate but interrelated events which may take
place in a number of national jurisidictions. The relevant question,
then, becomes; what event or combination of events within the United
States is sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction?
32 Murray v. The Schooner "Charming Betsy," 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
See also Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d
Cir. 1972); The Queen v. Jameson, [18961 2 Q.B. 425, 430.
33 See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d

Cir. 1972).
34

See text accompanying notes 60-63, 77-80 infra.
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a. The Cases
In Kook v. Crang,3 the initial case to consider the transnational
reach of the securities laws, the plaintiff, an American citizen acting
through a Canadian broker, purchased stock in a Canadian corporation
on the Toronto Stock Exchange. When the securities declined in value,
the plaintiff sued the Canadian broker, claiming violation of the
Federal Reserve Board margin requirements promulgated under section 7 (c) of the Exchange Act.3 6
The broker was registered with the SEC under section 15 of the
Exchange Act, maintained an office in New York, and carried on substantial business with members of the NYSE; but these activities were
not related to the plaintiff's purchases. The plaintiff's orders were
placed and payments received in Canada. Credit was extended and
collateral was held in Canada. Confirmation and all margin calls
emanated from Canada.
Finding that "[a]ll the essentials of these transactions occurred
without the United States, 3 7 the court dismissed the action for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. The court's dismissal was not based
on its reading of the principles of international law, but rather on
its interpretation of congressional intent as expressed in section
30(b), which states:
The provisions of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall not apply to any person insofar as he
transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction
of the United States ....
The court held that " 'jurisdiction' as used in section 30(b) contemplates some necessary and substantial act within the United States,"
and that the use of the mails and telephone within the United States
was insufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction. 9
The court's refusal to apply the American margin requirements
was reasonable in light of the defendant's insistence that the transaction take place in Toronto ° and the defendant's compliance with the
35 182 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y.

1960).
36 15 U.S.C. § 78(g)(c) (1970).
3
7 Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. at 390.
38 15 U.S.C.§ 78dd(b) (1970).
39 182 F. Supp. at 390-91. The use of the mails or other facilities of interstate commerce is relevant in 3 distinct ways: (1) as a prerequisite for the finding of a violation
of § 10(b) ; (2) as an element in determining subject matter jurisdiction; and (3) as an
element in determining personal jurisdiction. This Comment does not deal with personal
jurisdiction. With respect to the other 2 ways in which the use of the facilities of interstate commerce is significant, it should be noted that the use of those facilities which is
sufficient to warrant the finding of a violation of § 10(b)-which is essentially the use
which is sufficient to give Congress the power to regulate under the commerce clauseis not necessarily sufficient to warrant a finding of subject matter jurisdiction. See note
101 infra.
40 182 F. Supp. at 389.
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margin requirements of the Toronto Stock Exchange. 4' In such a case
it is fair to say that the plaintiff knowingly forwent the protection of
the American margin requirements for the similar, though not identical,
protection of the Canadian margin requirements.4 2 In addition, the
impact on United States markets of compliance with Canadian rather
than American margin requirements was not significant. And it is
generally difficult to apply complex American rules, such as margin
requirements, to a business which has only occasional American
43
customers .

In Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd.,44 the Second Circuit applied
section 16(b) to allow recovery of short swing insider profits made by
a Canadian mutual fund with its principle place of business in Switzerland. The court based jurisdiction on the fact that the transactions in

question were executed on the New York Stock Exchange by New
York brokers acting as agents for the fund. Kook v. Crang was distinguished on the ground that the transactions in that case were
effected outside the United States on the Toronto Stock Exchange.45
While the general test for jurisdiction established by the district
court in Kook and apparently approved by the Second Circuit in
Roth46 was that there must be "some necessary and substantial act
within the United States," a narrow reading of the holdings of those
cases might have suggested that the locus of the sale was determinative
of jurisdiction. 47 But any suggestion that the actual sale was the only
act sufficient to establish jurisdiction under the Exchange Act was
clearly rejected by the Leasco court.
41

Id.

42 This justification for the holding is thrown into question by § 29(a) of the Exchange Act, set forth at note 128 infra, which voids any agreement to waive compliance
with any provision of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1970). But the agreements and
expectations of the parties need not be considered only in terms of waiver; they can
also be considered as one of the factors determining whether or not the terms of the
Exchange Act are applicable in the first place. See text following note 131 infra.
43 In Kook v. Crang, the broker in question carried on substantial business in New
York, but this business was unrelated to the plaintiff's purchase. The transaction in
question was part of the broker's Canadian operations.
44405 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1968), aff'g 279 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 975 (1969).
45
Id. at 422.
46 The district court in Roth used the Kook test as a basis for distinguishing the
two cases, 279 F. Supp. at 936. In affirming the district court, the Second Circuit did not
indicate that it intended to apply a different standard than that specifically applied by
the district court.
47
But cf. Ferraioli v. Cantor, 259 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), in which a former
shareholder in a New York corporation commenced an action against a Canadian corporation which had previously controlled the New York corporation. Plaintiff claimed
that the Canadian corporation had disposed of its controlling interest in the New York
corporation to outsiders at a substantial premium over the existing market value without
making full disclosure to minority shareholders or granting them an opportunity to sell
at the same price-all allegedly in violation of § 10(b) and rule lob-5. Because the plaintiff made no allegation that any of the defendant's acts connected with the sale occurred
within the United States, the court dismissed the complaint. [1964-66 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. jI 91,615 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). On leave to amend, plaintiff alleged
that the gravamen of the complaint was the fraudulent transfer of control. The court
upheld jurisdiction because the transfer was partly consummated in the United States.
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In Leasco, the fraudulently induced stock purchases were executed
entirely on the London Stock Exchange. The Second Circuit found
that the "abundant misrepresentations" alleged to have been made in
the United States constituted sufficient conduct within the United
States to bring the transaction within the prescriptive jurisdiction of
the United States under the territorial principle.4" In the court's
opinion Judge Friendly explained:
Conduct within the territory alone would seem sufficient
from the standpoint of jurisdiction to prescribe a rule. It
follows that when, as here, there has been significant conduct within the territory, a statute cannot properly be held
inapplicable simply on the ground that absent the clearest
language, Congress will not be assumed to have meant to
go beyond the limits recognized by foreign relations law.49
Having concluded that principles of international law did not
preclude the application of section 10(b), the Leasco court turned
to the question of Congressional intent, asking
whether if Congress had thought about the point, it would not
have wished to protect an American investor if a foreigner
comes to the United States and fraudulently induces him to
purchase foreign securities abroad-a purpose which its
words can fairly be held to embrace. °
Relying on the injury to Leasco and its shareholders, the court
found that Congress would have wished to protect such an American
investor, at least when substantial misrepresentations were made in
the United States. 51
Judge Friendly's opinion offers some guidance as to limitations
imposed on the transnational application of rule 10b-5 by, or under,
the territorial principle. Specifically, Leasco suggests answers to the
following questions: what type of conduct within the United States
can form the basis for jurisdiction; how significant must the conduct
be to the transaction and the injury in question; and of what significance is the nationality of the parties who perform acts within the
United States.
Type of Conduct on Which JurisdictionCan Be Based
The Leasco opinion contains dictum indicating that making
telephone calls and sending mail to the United States is sufficient conduct to establish jurisdiction.52 And that dictum formed the basis of
the Eighth Circuit's finding of jurisdiction in Travis v. Anthes Imperial

b.

48 468 F.2d at 1334-35.
49

Id. at 1334 (latter emphasis supplied).
1d. at 1337.

50

511d.

52Id. at 1335.
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Ltd.5" Thus, there would appear to be few, if any, limitations on the
type of conduct which is sufficient for purposes of jurisdiction to
impose a rule.
c. Required Relation Between the Conduct and the Transaction and
Injury in Question
Conduct which establishes jurisdiction over a transaction must
be related in some way to that transaction.5 4 The court in Leasco
found it sufficient that the conduct within the United States was an
"essential link" in leading Leasco to sign the June 17 tender offer
agreement, and that that agreement was an "essential link" in inducing
Leasco to make the open-market purchases which caused the damages.5" As the court explained:
[I]f defendants' fraudulent acts within the United States
significantly whetted Leasco's interest in acquiring Pergamon
shares, it would be immaterial, from the standpoint of foreign
relations law, that the damage resulted, not from the contract
whose execution Maxwell procured in this country, but from
interrelated action which he induced in England or, for that
matter, which Leasco took there on its own. 6
While the court did not require that the conduct in the United
States be the direct cause of the damage, it did seem to contemplate
some closer causal connection between that conduct and the damage
than that the conduct simply be related in some incidental way to
the transaction. Friendly's doubts about jurisdiction extended to cases
53 [1972-73 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. gf93,718 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'g,
331 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Mo. 1971). In Travis, Molson, a Canadian conglomerate, made a
tender offer to the Canadian shareholders of Anthes, Limited, another Canadian corporation. The plaintiffs, American shareholders of Anthes, alleged that the defendants, Molson
and Anthes, fraudulently induced them to refrain from selling their shares by falsely
representing that after the expiration of the Canadian tender offer, a similar offer would
be made to all American shareholders. Molson refused to extend a similar offer to the
American shareholders, and the plaintiffs eventually sold their shares to Molson at the
prevailing market price, which was substantially lower than the price that the plaintiffs
could have received when they allegedly would have sold their shares but for the misrepresentations. The Eighth Circuit based its finding of jurisdiction on the allegations
that numerous communications took place between the plaintiffs in the United States and
the defendants in Canada through the mails and the telephone, and that the closing of
the sale of plaintiffs' shares to the defendant Molson took place in the United States.
But the sale itself was not an essential link in the scheme by which the defendants
allegedly defrauded the plaintiffs. The sale did not trigger the plaintiffs' loss in any way;
at most, it was the event which determined the size of the loss caused by the fraudulent
scheme. The fact that the closing took place in the United States, then, was not of great
significance. Jurisdiction must have been based primarily on the fact that substantial
representations and misrepresentations were made in the United States through the use
of the mails and the telephone. With respect to communications by mail and telephone,
the court, citing Leasco, stated that "both the place of sending and place of receipt constitute locations in which conduct takes place" for the purpose of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 93,181 n.16.
54
See text accompanying notes 35-37 supra; Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388, 391
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
55 468 F.2d at 1335.
56
Id.
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in which all the misconduct and misrepresentations occurred in another country, not just to those cases in which all the significant conduct took place in another country.57 It is unlikely that. the Leasco
court would have found jurisdiction if all the negotiations in the United
States were without misrepresentations, and all the misrepresentations
occurred in England. It is even more unlikely that the court would
have found subject matter jurisdiction if the sole import of any communications in the United States was to confirm plans to conduct
negotiations in England.
The requirement that the actual misrepresentations which form
the basis for the 10b-5 claim be made within the United States fails to
take account of the nature of transnational securities dealings. These
dealings usually touch upon the territory of more than one nation,
and whether a particular misrepresentation is made in one country or
another is often a matter of chance. The jurisdiction of a state should
not turn on such chance occurrences, for the interest of the state is
identical whether or not the particular misrepresentation is made
within the state. The requirement that conduct within the territory
be significant, or an essential link in the transaction, is better-suited
to protecting the interests of a state in regulating conduct within its
borders.
d. The Significance of Nationality When Jurisdiction is Based on
Acts Within the United States
In Leasco, rule 10b-5 protection was extended to an American
corporation even though the actual purchase was made by nominees
of its wholly-owned foreign subsidiary. The court reasoned that Leasco,
the United States corporation, was intimately involved in the transaction from the beginning; the debt securities of the foreign subsidiary
used to raise the cash for purchasing the Pergamon shares were fully
guaranteed by Leasco and convertible into Leasco common stock; 1
and the foreign entity was accepted by both parties as the alter ego of
Leasco.59
57

The court said: "If all the misrepresentations here alleged had occurred in England,

we would entertain most serious doubt whether . . . § 10(b) would be applicable . ..."

Id. at 1334. And in discussing congressional intent, the court indicated that: "It tips the
scales in favor of applicability when substantial misrepresentations were made in the
United States." Id. at 1337. The requirement that the actual misrepresentations take place
in the United States has been applied by the Southern District of New York in
Finch v. Marathon Securities Corporation, 316 F. Supp. 1345, 1348-49 (1970) (jurisdiction denied despite fact that the contract for sale was originally executed in New York,
because the alleged misrepresentations were made in London) and was apparently approved by the Eighth Circuit in Travis v. Anthes Imperial, Ltd., [1972-73 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 93,718 at 93,182 (1973) (jurisdiction upheld because
misrepresentations were made in the United States).
158468 F.2d at 1332.
59
Id. at 1338.
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The Leasco court strongly suggested that the nationality of the
plaintiff was crucial to its holding:
The case is quite different from another hypothetical we
posed at argument, namdly where a German and a Japanese
businessman met in New York for convenience, and the latter
fraudulently induced the former to make purchases of Japanese securities on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 0
In distinguishing the Leasco case from the German-Japanese hypothetical, Judge Friendly underscored the fact that even when jurisdiction is based on the territorial principle, some impact on American
citizens or American interests is necessary for the application of rule
10b-5. In most cases, conduct within the United States will have some
effect upon American citizens or interests. Even the German-Japanese
hypothetical would adversely affect the United States interest in
attracting foreigners to transact business in the United States, but as
Judge Friendly implicitly suggests, this adverse effect would be de
minimis. And the interest of the United States as a member of the
international community in promoting cooperation among nations
would support deferral by United States courts to the law of the
nations more concerned with the transaction. If, however, the German
and Japanese citizens were residents of the United States, engaged in
a securities business here, the United States would have a strong
interest in applying American law.
Any refusal of United States courts to extend rule 10b-5 protection to a foreigner defrauded by another foreigner within the
United States, when it would extend such protection to an American
defrauded by a foreigner in the same situation, raises questions under
the equal protection guarantee implicit in the fifth amendment.61 If
the refusal is compelled by the limitations imposed by international
law upon the prescriptive jurisdiction of the United States, then there
is no equal protection problem-for the equal protection guarantee
applies only within the United States' jurisdiction. 62 But international
law imposes no such limitations, for the territorial principle gives a
nation prescriptive jurisdiction over conduct which occurs within its
boundaries, regardless of whether or not any effects take place in its
territory.63 Any refusal by the courts to assert subject matter jurisdiction in Judge Friendly's German-Japanese hypothetical must be based
on the court's interpretation of congressional intent, in which case
the equal protection problem is not so easily dismissed.
60

Id.
61 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
62 It may be argued that since Congress is free to exceed the limitations imposed by
international law and extend the equal protection of American law to all foreigners, its
failure to do so violates the fifth amendment. But the interest of the United States in

abiding by the principles of international law is certainly compelling enough to justify

any disparity of treatment.
63 See RESTATEMNT (SEcoND), supra note 20, § 17, Comment a.
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It may be argued that the jurisdiction within which the equal
protection guarantee is effective is the subject matter jurisdiction of
the courts, and that since congressional intent with respect to the
applicability of section 10(b) determines the courts' subject matter
jurisdiction, the equal protection guarantee is ineffective if Congress
intended section 10(b) to be inapplicable. But to allow Congress to
deny equal protection of the law to persons (foreigners transacting
business between themselves) who are within the prescriptive jurisdiction of the United States by withholding subject matter jurisdiction
from the courts is to ignore the fact that the fifth amendment is directed not only to the courts, but also to Congress. The jurisdiction
within which the equal protection guarantee is applicable must be the
prescriptive jurisdiction of the United States as defined by the principles of international law, not the subject matter jurisdiction of the
courts as further limited by Congress. If, therefore, the refusal of the
courts to extend section 10(b) protection to foreigners on the same
basis as to American citizens is based upon the courts' interpretation
of congressional intent, the equal protection problem must be squarely
faced.
In addressing the equal protection questions posed by choice-oflaw cases involving nonresidents and noncitizens of the forum state,
Professor Brainerd Currie concluded:
a classification in terms of residence or citizenship is not
reasonable merely because it coincides with the limits of a
state's interest in applying its law. .

.

. Something more

than the state's lack of concern for the victim is needed to
establish the reasonableness of withholding the benefits of
such a law [wrongful death statute] from persons "within
the jurisdiction" of the state.64
Professor Currie was speaking primarily of the treatment of residents
and citizens of states within the United States, but his conclusion is
64 Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Equal Protection, in B.
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 526, 538-39 (1963)
[hereinafter
cited Unconstitutional Discrimination].See Quong.Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 184 Cal. 26, 192 P. 1021 (1920), writ of error dismissed, 255 U.S. 445 (1921).
The Supreme Court has distinguished between discrimination on the basis of state
citizenship and discrimination on the basis of state residence, finding the latter brand of
discrimination more easily justified. In Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279
U.S. 377 (1929), the Court upheld a state law which it interpreted to grant preferential
access to the state courts to residents over nonresidents and the Court implied that preferential access on the basis of citizenship would have violated the privileges and immunities clause of art. IV, § 2 of the Constitution. The bases for the Court's upholding the
preferential treatment of residents were the overcrowding of the courts, convenience and
the fact that residents pay for maintaining the courts.
Discrimination on the basis of residence was upheld by the Court, where discrimination on the basis of citizenship would have been held to violate art. IV, § 2 of the
Constitution, in two earlier cases: Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525 (1919) (tax rates);
La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919) (eligibility for licensing as an insurance
agent). In these two cases, unlike the Douglas case, the Court rejected a claim based on
the 14th amendment as well as one based on art. IV, § 2. But only in Maxwell did the
Court give reasons for its rejection of the equal protection claim: it found that any inequality in the incidence of the tax was incidental, and that the tax did not discriminate
between residents and nonresidents as classes. 250 U.S. at 543.
CuRRiE, SELECTED ESSAYS
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equally applicable to the treatment of residents and citizens of foreign
nations. The United States' lack of concern for aliens does not establish the reasonableness of withholding rule 10b-5 protection from
them. Moreover, classifications of aliens-or, at least, resident aliens
-have
been held to be suspect classifications which can only be
*justified by a showing of a compelling state interest.6 5 The United
States' lack of concern for aliens certainly does not rise to the level of
a compelling state interest.
Professor Currie suggested, however, that the "limits of a state's
interests become vitally important" when both the victim and- the
perpetrator of wrongful conduct are nonresidents. 6 Currie based this
conclusion in part on the full faith and credit clause. Although that
clause is operative only on an interstate level and not on an international one, the goal of cooperation which it advances has legitimacy
among nations as well as among states. When the United States has no
interest in a transaction involving two foreigners, and when the laws
of the victim's nation offer him protection, it is in the interest of the
United States, as a member of the international community, to yield
to the law of that nation. That interest may indeed be sufficient to
justify the refusal to provide the equal protection of American law
to that foreign victim, even though he is within the prescriptive jurisdiction of the United States.
2.

Jurisdiction Based on Effects Within the United States

In a clear and precise recital of the objective territorial principle,
Justice Holmes once wrote:
6

5
In re Griffiths, 41 U.S.L.W. 5143, 5144 (U.S. June 25, 1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420
(1948). Only resident aliens were involved in these cases, but in none of the cases did
the Court indicate that heightened judicial solicitude was to be denied nionresident aliens.
The rationale behind treating classifications based on alienage as inherently suspect applies equally to resident and nonresident aliens.
There are numerous cases in which the Supreme Court has upheld the discriminatory
treatment of aliens. One such case is Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392
(1927), in which the Court upheld the exclusion of aliens from eligibility for licenses to
operate pool and billiards rooms. But the Court in In re Griffiths, supra at 5144, observed that "the doctrinal foundations of Clarke were undermined in Takahashi v. Fish
and Game Comm'n," supra, and Graham v. Richardson, supra.
Several early immigration and deportation cases might appear to lend support to the
discriminatory treatment of aliens. E.g. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698
(1893) (deportation of Chinese laborers for failure to acquire certificates of residence
held constitutional); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (upheld
refusal to readmit an alien who, after living here for 12 years, left the country with a
certificate entitling him to return, where that refusal was dictated by the terms of a
statute passed 7 days before his return). But the decisions in In re Griffiths, Graham,
and Takahashi have drained these cases of much of their force. And any continuing force
which those cases exert can be attributed to the inherent power of a nation to control
immigration, the justifying factor in those cases, which is not a factor in the case of the
applicability of rule lob-5.
It should be emphasized that the nature of the discrimination and the nature of the
alleged state interest determine the validity of a classification under the compelling state
interest test, but they do not determine the applicability of that test. That the compelling
state interest standard is the applicable one is determined by the nature of the class
(aliens) as a "discrete and insular minority." United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
66 UnconstitutionalDiscrimination,supra note 64, at 539.
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Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and
producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in
punishing the cause of the harm as if he [the actor] had been
present at the effect,
if the State should succeed in getting him
7
within its power.1
The objective territorial principle is expressed in'section 18 of the
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law as follows:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching
legal consequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory
and causes an effect within its territory, if either
(a) the conduct and its. effect are generally recognized
as constituent elements of a crime or tort under the law of
states that have reasonably developed legal systems, or
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which the rule applies; (ii) the effect
within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct
and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory;
and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of
justice generally recognized by states that have reasonably
developed legal systems.6
a. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook
It was the effects doctrine embodied in section 18 which, according to Judge Friendly,6 9 permitted the Second Circuit to apply rule
10b-5 in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook.70 In Schoenbaum, Banff, a
Canadian corporation whose common stock was traded on the American Stock Exchange, was controlled by Aquitaine of Canada, Ltd.
Banff's Board of Directors, dominated by Aquitaine nominees, approved the sale of Banff treasury shares to Aquitaine at market price.
The negotiations, offer, acceptance, and delivery, as well as payment
in Canadian funds, all took place in Canada, between Canadians. An
American minority shareholder of Banff filed a derivative suit,
alleging that Aquitaine was privy to inside information, which if disclosed would have substantially raised the market price of Banff shares.
67 Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911). See also United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945); Case of the S.S. "Lotus," [1927]
P.C.I.J.,
ser. A, No. 9.
68
REsTATEmNT (SECOND), supra note 20, § 18.
Note that the Restatement does not list actual intent to produce effects within the
territory as a necessary element, as Holmes did in Strassheim, note 67 supra & accompanying text. But the requirement in (b) (iii) that the effect be "direct and foreseeable"
serves the same purpose as an intent requirement.
The requirements in (b) (ii) and (b) (iii) have been criticized as "unsupported by
the authorities." Metzger, The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States: Bases and Conflicts of Jurisdiction,41 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 7, 15 (1966).
69468 F.2d at 1333-34.
70405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), aff'g in part, rev'g in part, 268 F. Supp. 385 (SD.
N.Y. 1967). Having reversed the district court's finding of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court went on to hold that the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action
under rule 10b-5, but the panel was reversed on this latter point after rehearing en banc.
405 F.2d 215, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).

1380

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 121:1363

In effect, the minority shareholder contended that Aquitaine, using its
controlling position on Banff's board, had sold stock to itself for
inadequate consideration, thus defrauding the corporation and its
minority shareholders in violation of rule 10b-5.
The district court concluded that the Exchange Act had no
extraterritorial application. 7 1 In disagreeing with the district court, the
Second Circuit found that the importance of maintaining fair and
honest markets was sufficient to rebut "the usual presumption against
extraterritorial application of legislation.1 72 Chief Judge Lumbard,

speaking for the court, stated:
We believe that Congress intended the Exchange Act to have
extraterritorial application in order to protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities on American
exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market from
the effects of improper foreign transactions in American securities.73
The Schoenbaum court held that the Exchange Act is applicable
to transactions which take place outside the United States, "at least
when the transactions involve stock registered and listed on a national
securities exchange, and are detrimental to the interests of American
investors. 4
The Schoenbaum court did not explicitly ground its finding of
jurisdiction on any principle of international law, but it implicitly
based jurisdiction on the objective territorial principle. While the court
limited its holding to the facts of the case, the broad terms of the
objective territoriality principle would not seem to restrict the applicability of United States law to cases in which the traded stock is
listed on an American exchange, and the Schoenbaum court's broad
dicta on the importance of the investor-protecting policies of the securities laws left open the possibility that the courts could extend jurisdiction based on the impact of foreign transactions within the United
States beyond the facts of Schoenbaum. Specifically, the broad language
of Schoenbaum raised three questions:
First, what type of detrimental impact within the United States
does Schoenbaum contemplate? Second, how crucial to the holding was
71 268 F. Supp. at 392.
72 405 F.2d at 206.
7

8 Id.
Id. at 208. A literal reading of this holding would extend 10b-5 protection to
American investors defrauded by a foreign national in the purchase of stock in a foreign
country, when, coincidentally, the stock was listed on an American exchange. But the
principles of international law would not countenance such an extension of rule 10b-5
applicability. If the transaction did not take place on the American exchange, and if,
unlike in Schoenbaum, no indirect effect was felt by other Americans in the United States,
the sole basis for jurisdiction would be the nationality of the injured party. The United
States rejects that basis of jurisdiction (the passive personality principle). Research in
InternationalLaw, supra note 20, at 445, 579.
74
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the registration of Banff stock on an American exchange? Would a
substantial over-the-counter market in the United States or a substantial number of American shareholders be sufficient for jurisdictional purposes? Third, does jurisdiction depend upon injury to
domestic investors or American investors?
b.

Type of Impact Sufficient for Jurisdiction

The Schoenbaum court found that the following effect within the
United States was sufficient to warrant the assertion of jurisdiction:
A fraud upon a corporation which has the effect of depriving
it of fair compensation for the issuance of its stock would
necessarily have the effect of reducing the equity of the
corporation's shareholders and this reduction in equity would
be reflected in lower prices bid for the shares on the domestic
stock market. 5
In Schoenbaum, the "impairment of the value of American investment" resulted from the sale by a corporation of its own stock. There
are, of course, other contexts in which fraudulent foreign transactions
would impair the value of American investments.
For example, if Banff were fraudulently induced to purchase
stock in another corporation at a price higher than the actual value,
Banff assets would be depleted, the equity underlying Banff's American
shareholders' investment would be reduced, and Banff stock would
bring a lower price on the domestic market. American shareholders
would feel the effects of the transaction irrespective of any domestic
market in the securities purchased. Would these effects warrant the
application of rule 10b-5 to the transaction?
This was one question before the court in Leasco, with the single
exception that, unlike Banff in the above hypothetical, the purchaser,
Leasco, was an American corporation. The foreign securities purchased
by Leasco were not listed on an American exchange or traded over the
counter in the United States, but Leasco stock was traded on the New
York Stock Exchange. Because Leasco's purchase of foreign securities
at an inflated price had the effect of depressing the value of Leasco
as a going concern and the price of Leasco stock, the district court
found that rule 10b-5 was applicable on the Schoenbaum rationale.
The court explicitly rejected the argument that the only impact sufficient to warrant the assertion of subject matter jurisdiction was an
impact on domestic markets in the securities being bought and sold."
On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld subject matter jurisdiction
on the basis of the defendants' "significant conduct" within the United
75

Id. 208.
76 [1971-72 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ff 93,454, at 92,248.
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States, but refused to extend the Schoenbaum rationale to the Leasco
case. The court advised:
If all the misrepresentations here alleged had occurred in
England, we would entertain most serious doubt whether
§ *10(b) would be applicable simply because of the
adverse effect [in the United States] of the fraudulently induced purchases in England of securities of an English corporation, not traded in an organized American securities market,
upon an American corporation whose stock is listed
on the
77
New York Stock Exchange and its shareholders.
In basing subject matter jurisdiction on the defendants' conduct within
the United States, rather than on the effect of the transaction within
the United States, the court impliedly indicated a need to impose some
limitations on the transnational reach of rule 10b-5. But Judge
Friendly's opinion clarifies neither the source nor the scope of these
limitations.
Judge Friendly indicated that the language of section 10(b) was
"much too inconclusive to lead us to believe that Congress meant to
impose rules governing conduct throughout the world in every instance
where an American company bought or sold a security.178 In the same
section of the opinion, Judge Friendly expressed doubts about whether
the effects in Leasco fell within the ambit of section 18 of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law.79 It is unclear then to what
extent the limitations contemplated by the court were attributable to
its interpretation of congressional intent, and to what extent they were
dictated by its reading of the principles of international law.
With respect to the objective territorial principle, the Leasco
case is indistinguishable from Schoenbaum, for the impact on American
shareholders is the same whether the corporation is damaged by
selling its own stock or by purchasing another's stock. It is, perhaps,
tenable to suggest that Congress intended to protect American shareholders of a foreign corporation from the adverse effects of a fraud
perpetrated against the foreign corporation in the sale of its own stock
(Schoenbaum), but did not intend to protect American shareholders
of an American corporation which was deceived abroad in the purchase of another's stock (Leasco). But the reason for such congressional intent is not readily apparent, and the Second Circuit provides
no explanation in Leasco.
Beyond the Leasco and Schoenbaum situations, there are other
types of adverse impact which might be sufficient to establish jurisdiction under the effects doctrine. In addition to stating that Congress
intended "to protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign
77468 F.2d at 1334.
78 Id.
79

Id. at 1333-34.
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securities on American exchanges," Schoenbaum advised that Congress
also sought to "protect the domestic securities market from improper
foreign transactions in American securities.180 The Schoenbaum opinion offered no examples of the type of activities contemplated by this
statement, but several examples suggest themselves. Consider the activities of offshore mutual funds. These funds deal in American securities, and fraudulent transactions by these funds can discourage foreign
investors from dealing further in American securities. s ' A number of
the offshore funds have come under 10b-5 attack, but jurisdiction has
been denied unless the plaintiff could show that shares in the funds
were sold to Americans or that the funds2 were actually controlled and
directed from within the United States.

Consider also the case of one foreigner fraudulently inducing another foreigner to purchase abroad a large block of American stock
which is widely held but thinly traded. That transaction would affect
the market.price in the United States, and to the extent that American
investors relied on the market price to their detriment, there would be
an adverse impact on American investors. The SEC staff has taken the
position that purchases in foreign markets, which otherwise fall within
the proscription of rule 10b-5, violate that rule because these purchases
would have an impact on the price of the stock in the American
market.83 The same rationale calls for the application of rule 10b-5 to
foreign transactions such as the one described above, which can be
expected to have an impact on prices in the American market.
Any transaction directly or indirectly involving or affecting Americans is arguably a proper target of American law under the objective
territorial principle, for the objective territorial principle contains no
self-imposed limitations-except for requirements, present in some
versions and absent in others, of intent, foreseeability and substantiality of effect.8" At its extreme, the objective territorial principle blends
into the passive personality principle of asserting jurisdiction over
conduct which injures one's nationals-a principle which the United
States rejects. There is clearly a need for some limitation on the type
of impact within the United States which is sufficient for jurisdictional
purposes.
80

See text accompanying note 73 supra.

81 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1972, at 49, col, 7.
82 Compare SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973) (dis-

cussed at text accompanying notes 105-07 infra) with Investment Properties Int'l, Ltd.
v. I.O.S., Ltd., [1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1193,011, (S.D.N.Y.
1971); Recaman v. Fidelity Bank, Civil No. 73-337 (E.D. Pa. February 16, 1973) (in
denying temporary restraining order, court explained partially that "there is substantial
reason for believing that the Court may lack subject matter jurisdiction" over transactions involving shares in a foreign-based investment fund, none of whose shareholders
were United States citizens and no purchases or sales of which took place in the United
States).
83 See note 3 supra.
84
See notes 67-68 supra & accompanying text.
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If one accepts Judge Friendly's dictum that a United States court
would not have subject matter jurisdiction in Leasco if none of the
misrepresentations had taken place in the United States, one could try
to explain the Schoenbaum and Leasco holdings without resort to the
objective territorial principle--merely by broadening the territorial
notions of jurisdiction and adopting a somewhat strained reading of
Schoenbaum. On this reading, the facts of Schoenbaum would be
viewed as a two-stage operation. First, the controlling directors and
management of Banff made a decision to come to the United States and
register Banff on the American Stock Exchange with the purpose of
attracting American investors. Second, these same controlling parties
then entered into a fraudulent stock scheme that injured these same
American investors. On this basis Schoenbaum could be distinguished
from the hypothetical Leasco case (with no misrepresentations in the
United States), in which a corporation was defrauded by a third party
foreign national who had nothing to do with the American investors'
original decision to invest in the United States.
While a broadened interpretation of the territorial principle can
explain the limitations on the transnational application of rule 10b-5
contemplated by the Second Circuit in Leasco, it offers no compelling
justification for these limitations. Indeed, reliance on the territorial
principle may prove less satisfactory than reliance on the objective
territorial principle, for the United States has a greater interest in.
regulating securities transactions wliich have an effect within the
United States than transactions which merely take place within the
United States.
The proper scope for the applicability of rule 10b-5 cannot be
defined by resorting simply to either the territorial or the objective
territorial principles. These principles do provide convenient descriptive categories and suggest ways of distinguishing cases, but they provide no substitute for the comprehensive policy analysis that is necessary for the determination whether a particular type of impact justifies the application of rule 10b-5.
c. Indicators of the Existence of a Domestic Market in the Affected
Security
While issuing broad dicta on the importance of protecting domestic markets,8 5 the Schoenbaum court carefully limited its holding to
the case in which the stock of the injured corporation is traded on an
American exchange.8 6 But if jurisdiction is based solely upon the
effects of a transaction within the United States, there is no reason to
require registration on an American exchange; the necessary effects
would be felt as long as there exists a domestic market in the affected
85 405 F.2d at 206.

86 See text accompanying note 74 supra.
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securities. The district court in Leasco agreed"7 with Judge Frankel's
statement of the question in Investment PropertiesInternational Ltd.
v.I.O.S., Ltd:
does the transaction have some significant impact on the
domestic securities market -or on domestic investors, and is
extraterritorial application therefore necessary to protect
securities
trading in the United States and/or American in88
vestors?

Under Judge Frankel's broad formulation of the impact requirement, trading on an American exchange would not be the only type of
domestic trading sufficient to warrant the application of rule 10b-5.
This result is consistent with the general requirements of the objective
territorial principle and is supported by the fact that Congress did
not generally restrict the protection of the securities laws to those who
traded on the organized exchanges.8 " Certainly, Congress would not
have intended to extend protection in a Schoenbaum-type situation to
the American investor who buys foreign stock on an American exchange but not to the American investor who buys foreign stock over
the counter in the United States.
The listing of a stock on an American exchange or on NASDAQ
has a dual significance. First, either should give rise to a presumption
of the existence of both a domestic market in the security and the
existence of American shareholders. In the absence of such listing, a
court seeking to determine the impact of a transaction within the
United States would have to examine other factors such as registration of the initial offering under the 1933 Act, the nationality of
shareholders, and the fhanner in which they acquired their interests.
Second, to the extent that intent to produce effects within a nation is
an element of the objective territorial principle, 0 the listing of a stock
on an American exchange or on NASDAQ would lay the basis for a
finding of implied intent to affect, since it would put the parties to a
transnational stock deal on notice of the probable existence of an
American market. If the company itself is the defendant, the listing
of the company's securities provides an even stronger basis for a
finding of intent to produce effects within the United States, since it
87 [1971-72 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. II 93,454, at 92,248.
88 [1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. Rtp. ff 93.011, at 90,735 (S.D.N.Y.

1971).
89 Corporations of significant size, both foreign and domestic, are required to register
their securities and satisfy the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act whether or
not they are listed on an exchange. And the language of § 10(b) makes rule 10b-5
applicable to all purchases and sales of securities via interstate commerce regardless of
whether they are executed on a stock exchange or over the counter.
The Second Circuit in Leasco took notice of congressional intent to apply § 10(b)
to purchases and sales of securities "whether or not these [securities] were traded on
organized United States markets." 468 F.2d at 1336.
90
See notes 67-68 supra & accompanying text.
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reflects an active effort on the company's part to secure an American
market.
d. Protecting American Investors vs. Protecting Domestic Investors
Schoenbaum and Investment Propertiesused the terms "domestic
investor" and "American investor" interchangeably, without regard
to their distinct meanings." An American investor could be defined
reasonably as a United States national who invests; a domestic investor
as any person, regardless of nationality, who invests through domestic
exchanges or domestic over-the-counter markets. Basing subject matter
jurisdiction on injury to American investors will produce different
results than basing jurisdiction on injury to domestic investors.
By using the terms "domestic investor" and "American investor"
interchangeably Schoenbaum perhaps meant to limit the extension of
rule 10b-5 protection under the effects doctrine to Americans who
invest through domestic facilities or to American investors regardless
of where they invest." But any interpretation which restricts protection to Americans offends the principle that all persons, including
aliens and foreign citizens, are to receive equal protection of the law. 3
Moreover, if the purpose of the Exchange Act was not only to protect
the investments of individuals but also to preserve the integrity of
American markets necessary for the free flow of capital,9 4 to fail to
extend equal rule 10b-5 protection to foreign nationals who choose to
invest through American markets would contravene congressional
intent.
91 In successive sentences, the Schoenbaum court spoke of congressional intent "to
protect domestic investors" and "to protect American investors." 405 F.2d at 206. For
the interchangeable use of the terms in Investment Properties, see text accompanying note
88 supra.*
92 But the Schoenbaum court did not inquire into the number of American shareholders in Banff, nor did it ask where the American plaintiff acquired his shares. Perhaps the court depended upon Banif's registration on the American Stock Exchange as
prima facie evidence of the existence of American shareholders who purchased the stock
domestically.
93 If, of course, the restriction is compelled by the principles of international law,
there is no equal protection problem. Note 62 supra & accompanying text. But the objective territorial principle, which gives a state prescriptive jurisdiction over conduct which
produces an effect within that state, does not specify that that effect must be felt by a
citizen of that state, rather than by a foreign national. In the case of a foreign citizen
who invests through American facilities, however, it may not be necessary to rely upon
the conclusion that a state has jurisdiction to regulate conduct which affects foreigners
within that state, for any conduct which affects a foreign citizen by way of his investments through American markets also affects those American markets. By either line of
reasoning, the United States has prescriptive jurisdiction, and the equal protection problems must be faced.
Not as in the case of the German and Japanese businessmen, text accompanying
note 60 supra, who meet in New York for convenience, the United States has a significant interest in protecting the foreigner who invests through American markets. And
as the interest of the United States in affording protection is greater, the interest of the
United States in yielding to the law of another nation is less compelling, and the differential treatment is more difficult to justify within the confines of the guarantee of
equal protection. See generally text accompanying notes 64-66 supra.
94
See note 73 supra & accompanying text.
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The Significance of Nationality

a. Nationality of the Plaintiffs
As already indicated, the Leasco court found that the actual
purchaser, a Netherlands Antilles corporation, was but an alter ego
of the Amerian plaintiff, who was ultimately responsible for the
performance of the obligation to acquire the shares. This insight was
crucial to the court's finding of subject matter jurisdiction. 95 But there
was no suggestion in Leasco that nationality alone was determinative
of subject matter jurisdiction. Indeed the United States rejects the
passive personality principle, which gives a nation jurisdiction to
prescribe rules governing conduct which injures one of its citizens.
While the American nationality of the plaintiff is not a sufficient
element for jurisdiction, it was apparently a necessary one in Leasco.
In other cases, such as the case of a foreign investor purchasing
American securities on an American exchange, American nationality
would, no doubt, not even be necessary. The nationality of the plaintiff
is, then, but one element in the jurisdictional calculus.
b. Nationality of the Defendants
The Leasco court's willingness to "pierce the nationality veil"
and identify the actual nationality of the characters involved in a
securities transaction would undoubtedly extend to defendants as well
as to plaintiffs. And the nationality of the defendants, unlike that of
the plaintiffs, provides by itself a proper basis for jurisdiction (the
nationality principle)."
Despite the United States' acceptance of the nationality principle,97 no court has applied the securities laws solely on the basis of
the defendant's nationality. In a couple of cases, however, the
American nationality of the defendants, as determined after the nationality veil has been pierced, can explain the application of section
10(b) beyond the limits suggested by the cases in which jurisdiction
was based solely upon conduct or effects within the United States.
In SEC v. Gulf Intercontinental Finance Corp.,98 a group of
Florida businessmen organized a Canadian corporation, Gulf Intercontinental, to raise new capital for their automobile sale and leasing
business. Gulf Intercontinental securities (8 and 8-1/2 % notes) were
sold in Canada to Canadians by means of an advertising campaign in
sixty-three of the leading daily newspapers in principal Canadian
cities. When the scheme was unable to earn monthly interest requirements on the notes and a substantial principal impairment resulted,
95 Text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
96

Text accompanying notes 23-32 supra.
97 RESTATEIMNT (SEcoND), supra note 20, § 30 (1965).
98 223 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Fla. 1963).
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the SEC sought an injunction, appointment of a receiver, and an accounting to the investors defrauded in violation of rule 10b-5. With
respect to the defendants' nationality, the district court concluded:
Looking through the transparent fabric of this promotional
scheme, it becomes obvious that the true issuers of the notes
... were the Florida defendants . . . . Gulf Intercontinental was nothing more than a conduit . . .9

But the court did not expressly base its finding of subject matter
jurisdiction on the defendants' nationality. Referring to the fact that
a substantial number of copies of the Canadian newspapers containing
Gulf Intercontinental's advertising were circulated in the United
States, the court said:
It is sufficient for subject matter jurisdiction under the Acts
that such offers be made within the United States without a
showing that such offers were accepted by actual sale, or
that the alleged misrepresentations were in fact successful in
inducing the sale of such securities by reliance thereon.0 0
And the court continued to say that even if the offer had been made
entirely outside the nation, rule 10b-5 protection would be available
as long as the scheme "necessarily must be accomplished in part by
use of the mails or interstate facilities."'' 1
There was no showing in Gulf Intercontinentalthat the advertising which appeared in the United States induced any purchases by
Americans or by foreigners within the United States. Nor was there
any showing that the interstate communications contained misrepresentations or were as closely related to the transaction in question as
were the communications in Leasco.'0 2 It is doubtful, then, that the
court's finding of jurisdiction can be justified under. the "necessary
and substantial act" test of Kook v. Crang °3 or the "significant conduct" and "essential link" standards of Leasco.' 4 Since there was no
domestic market in the securities, the effects doctrine of Scioenbaum
991 d. at 995 (footnote omitted).
1old. at 994-95 (footnotes omitted).
101 Id. at 995. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on cases which held that
the requirement in the Securities Act that some use be made of the facilities of interstate
commerce was intended to create a basis for federal jurisdiction, and that the use of
these facilities need not be central to the fraudulent scheme and may be entirely incidental to it (United States v. Cashin, 281 F.2d 669, 673 (5th Cir. 1960) ; Creswell-Keith,
Inc. v. Willingham, 264 F.2d 76 (8th Cir. 1959)). 223 F. Supp. at 995 n.16. But the
court's reliance on these cases was misplaced. It should not be assumed that the use of
interstate facilities which is sufficient to give Congress the power to regulate under the
commerce clause of the Constitution is also sufficient to give the United States jurisdiction to regulate under the principles of international law. Nor should it be assumed that
Congress intended to utilize its prescriptive jurisdiction as defined by international law
to the 2same extent it intended to use its powers as defined by the Constitution.
10 See text accompanying notes 54-57 supra.
1O3 Text accompanying notes 38-39 supra.
104 Text accompanying notes 49, 57 supra.
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offers no support for subject matter jurisdiction. If the Gulf Intercontinental decision is not to be viewed as a departure from the territorial and objective territorial principles of jurisdiction as applied in
these cases, the nationality of the defendants must be regarded as the
determinative factor.
Nationality played a similar role in a more recent case involving
offshore mutual funds, SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc.10 5 The
Commission, alleging violation of rule 10b-5, sought an injunction and
appointment of a receiver pendente lite against UFG, a Delaware
holding company which controlled a large complex of mutual funds
incorporated in foreign countries. The Ninth Circuit based its finding
of jurisdiction on its conclusion that "the complex of foreign companies
was in fact directed and controlled as an integrated whole from the
United States," combined with its findings that Americans held shares
in some of the funds and that the defendants made use of the mails and
other facilities of interstate commerce. 10 6
But these latter two findings alone do not support jurisdiction,
absent an expansion of the acts and effects doctrines as articulated by
the Schoenbaum and Leasco courts. From all of the shareholders in
over twenty investment companies, the SEC was able to identify only
three Americans, all of whom purchased their shares abroad.0 7 After
Leasco, the effects doctrine of Schoenbaum does not support jurisdiction in such a case. The facilities of interstate commerce were used
to prepare and distribute prospectuses, to set up sales meetings, and
to consummate investment transactions. But there was no indication
in the court's opinion that any misrepresentations were made through
the facilities of interstate commerce or that the use of these facilities
constituted an essential link in the allegedly fraudulent transactions.
The conduct within the United States appears less significant than the
conduct in Leasco. The American nationality of the defendant emerges,
then, as a critical, if not the decisive, factor.
In summary, the nationality of the defendants has not yet provided the sole basis for a court's finding of jurisdiction. 08 But the
defendant's nationality, like the plaintiff's nationality, is sometimes
the swing weight in the jurisdictional balance.
105474
106
07

F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973).

Id. at 356.

Id.
108 The American nationality of the parties who controlled an off-shore mutual fund
was considered significant, but not sufficient for subject matter jurisdiction ever transactions in shares of the fund, in Finch v. Marathon Securities Corp., 316 F. Supp. 1345
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). The court refused application of § 10(b) because the substance of the
fraud occurred outside the United States, the parties were predominantly foreign, the
subject shares were in a foreign corporation and were neither registered nor traded on a
national exchange, and there was no domestic injury. Id. at 1349. But the court indicated that the "jurisdiction gap" was "partially bridge[d]" by the facts that 6 of the
fund's 8 directors were American and an Illinois corporation "maintained substantial control over" the fund. Id. at 1347.
1
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4.

The Section 30(b) Exemption

Essential to any comprehensive study of the transnational applicability of section 10(b) is the little-explor-d section 30(b) of the
Exchange Act, which provides:
The provisions of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall not apply to any person insofar as he
transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of
the United States, unless he transacts such business in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate to prevent the
evasion of this chapter. °9
The only "persons" eligible for the section 30(b) exemption are
professionals, such as brokers, dealers, banks, and investment companies, who regularly engage in securities trading in the course of their
business.o1°

A more difficult question of interpretation stems from the phrase
"without the jurisdiction of the United States." In most cases, courts
have read "jurisdiction" in the territorial sense, thereby making the
exemption available to all persons transacting a business in securities
outside the territory of the United States."' At least one commentator
has suggested that Schoenbaum departed from this territorial interpretation."2 But a close reading of Schoenbaum indicates that the court
may have based its holding that the section 30(b) exemption was
unavailable solely on the absence of a business in securities, rather
than on the conclusion that the transaction was not "without the
jurisdiction of the United States" under sectiori 30(b)."' And the
following dictum, if not the result of oversight, suggests that the court
adopted the territorial interpretation of jurisdiction in section 30(b):
The purpose of [section 30(b)] is to permit persons in the
securities business to conduct transactions in securities out109 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1970)

(emphasis added).
110 See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 1968). Compare Kook
v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) with Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., 405
F.2d 421, 422 (2d Cir. 1968).
In Leasco, Fleming Ltd., a British Merchant Bank and investment counsellor that
regularly trades in securities, claimed exemption under § 30(b) in the district court. The
Second Circuit did not deal with the § 30(b) exemption, and it is unclear whether the
district court based its denial of the 30(b) exemption on a finding that Fleming was not
"without the jurisdiction of the United States," or on a finding that Fleming was not
transacting a "business in securities." See [1971-72 Transfer Binder] CCH FEn. SEc. L.
REP. ff 93,454, at 92,243-44. If one considers the general holding in Leasco that the
transaction was within the jurisdiction of the United States, the former reading is preferable.
111 Note, The International Character of Securities Credit: A Regulatory Problem,
2 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 147, 158 (1970).
112 Id.

113 See 405 F.2d at 207-08.
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side of the United States without complying with the burdensome reporting requirements of the14Act and without being
subject to its regulatory provisions.
But the territorial interpretation and the expansive section 30(b)
exemption which it supports are inconsistent with the thrust of the
Schoenbaum holding." 5 Indeed, in SEC v. United Financial Group,
Inc., the Ninth Circuit cited Schoenbaum to support its conclusion that
116
the meaning of "jurisdiction" was not limited to "territorial limits."
As the SEC maintained in its amicus brief in Schoenbaum, to
interpret "without the jurisdiction of the United States" as the equivalent of "without the United States" "would do violence to the accepted
canon of statutory construction that, if possible, effect must be given
to every word of a statute. M 17 "Jurisdiction" should be read to mean
the prescriptive jurisdiction of1 the United States, as defined by the
principles of international law."8
The remaining key phrase in section 30(b) is the phrase "insofar
as," through which Congress interjected the concept of divisibility
into its regulatory scheme. The phrase acknowledges that securities
business is divisible into transactions within and transactions without
the prescriptive jurisdiction of the United States, and it focuses attention not on the general character of that person's business, but on
the nature of the particular transactions involved in the case in controversy. If a given transaction or activity is determined to lie without
the jurisdiction of the United States, the provisions of the Exchange
Act are inapplicable. Thus, for example, in Kook v. Crang a Canadian
broker, who was registered with the SEC and did business in the
United States, was held not to be subject to the margin requirements
of section 7(c) "' with respect to a transaction on the Toronto Stock
Exchange in securities not traded in the United States. 2 The same
divisibility principle governs the applicability of section 10(b) to
persons transacting businesses in securities.
114 Id. at 207 (emphasis added).
"1 Schoenbaum held that Congress intended rule lob-5 to apply to a transaction
which takes place outside the United States among foreigners who are not conducting a
business in securities, if the transaction has an adverse impact on domestic markets and
American investors. Text accompanying notes 74-75 supra. The combined Schoenbaum
holding and dicta suggest the anomalous conclusion that Congress intended to protect the
American investor from the effects of a fraudulent extraterritorial transaction if that
transaction was an isolated transaction of a foreign individual or corporation, but not if
that transaction was part of the business of a securities dealer.
116 474 F.2d 354, 357 n.8 (9th Cir. 1973).
117 Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae, at 23, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200
(2d Cir. 1968). See 2 J. SuTnERLAND, STATuToRY Co'NsTRucTrow § 4705 (3d ed. J. Horack
1943).
118 Cf. Unconstitutional Discrimination,supra note 64, at 530-36, in which Currie
discusses the meaning of the phrase "within its jurisdiction" in the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment.
119 15 U.S.C. § 78(g) (1970).
120 182 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); text accompanying notes 35-41 supra.
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IV.
A.

DERIVING A JURISDICTIONAL CALCULUS

The Inadequacy of the Current Approach and the Relevance
of Choice-of-Law Principles

The present limits on the transnational applicability of rule
10b-5 are the result of a jurisdictional calculus which resorts to general
principles of international law in setting the outer limits of applicability, and speculation on congressional intent in determining the proper
scope of section 10(b) within those outer limits. This two-step analysis
is inadequate to the task of resolving the complex jurisdictional questions presented by transnational securities dealings. The principles of
international law, particularly the objective territorial principle, provide little more than broad guidelines, and speculation on congressional intent behind section 10(b) offers little promise of providing
satisfactory answers to these jurisdictional questions.
Congress never considered the applicability of section 10(b) in
many of the domestic contexts in which it is presently applied, much
less in the transnational setting. In the domestic context, judicial application of section 10(b) in circumstances beyond those contemplated
by Congress in 1934 has proven beneficial. 121 In the transnational
setting, judicial application of section 10(b) in circumstances beyond
those contemplated by Congress in* 1934 is necessary in many cases,
but the courts should neither undertake to apply section 10(b) nor to.
refuse its application without an appreciation of the consequences of
their doing so. This appreciation does not come simply from bald
speculation on what Congress would have intended if it had considered
the particular question.
If the courts are to base their jurisdictional decisions in the transnational setting on the somewhat artificial concept of congressional
intent, that "congressional intent" must reflect more than the underlying purposes of the Exchange Act. The "congressional intent" which is
relevant to the transnational application of the Exchange Act is the
vector sum of the following elements: the underlying purposes of the
Exchange Act; other policies and interests of the United States; the
legitimate expectations of the parties; the need for certainty and
predictability; the policies and interests of other nations; and the
common interest of all nations in international harmony. These are the
elements which, in the absence of an express statutory directive to
apply the forum's law, are relevant to the choice of law under modern
conflicts principles. 22
The cases dealing with the transnational application of section
121 See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, rev'g on rehearing en bane 405
F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Comment, Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook: The "New Fraud" Expands Federal Corporation Law, 55 VA. L. Rxv. 1103
(1969).
1 22
IESTATE.mNT (SEcoND) OF CoNrLIcT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
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10(b) are notable for their failure to consider these factors. The
defendants in Leasco argued that since choice-of-law principles would
select the law of England as the applicable law, application of section
10(b) would violate international law. 2 ' The Leasco court properly
rejected that argument, for the limits on the United States' jurisdiction
to prescribe a rule are set by the principles of international law, not by
choice-of-law principles. But the court went on to say that even if
choice-of-law principles indicated that English law should govern,
section 10(b) would still be applicable because
in the circumstances described in § 17 of the Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law, under which this case fits, the nation
where the conduct has occurred has jurisdiction to displace
foreign law and to direct its courts to apply its own.' 24
The problem with this statement is that Congress did not explicitly
direct the courts to apply section 10(b) in cases like Leasco. In view
of that fact, which Friendly acknowledged,'125 his dismissal of choiceof-law principles does injustice to their true relevance. In the absence
of express congressional intent, choice-of-law principles are a useful
guide to interpreting a statute's spatial reach. 26 We turn, then, to a
brief analysis of how the interests considered important under choiceof-law principles relate to the transnational application of section
10(b).
B.

Choice-of-Law Principles and the TransnationalApplicability
of Rule lOb-5
1. Reducing Uncertainty and Rewarding Expectations

a. Enforceability of Choice-of-Law and Choice-of-Forum Clauses
The parties to a transnational contract will often specify the law
applicable to the transaction and an exclusive forum for the settle123 468 F.2d at 1338.
24
1 1d. at 1339.
125 Id. at 1334.
126 Cf. Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 Duxa
LJ. 171, 178. For an example of a case in which the court referred to choice-of-law principles (particularly the outdated lex loci delicti test) as a guide to the interpretation of a
statute, see Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956).
Although Judge Friendly dismissed the defendants' conflicts argument as irrelevant
in Leasco, he resorted to conflicts principles to support the applicability of rule 10b-5.
Friendly referred to the modem choice-of-law principle of looking to the state which has
"the most significant relationship" to the transaction for the purpose of determining the
applicable law, in order to counter the suggestion that Congress would have wished to
withdraw protection from an American investor who is the subject of a fraudulent misrepresentation in New York simply because the final event (mailing the stock certificate)
took place abroad. 468 F.2d at 1337. By pointing to conflicts principles to suggest congressional intent to apply section 10(b), Friendly's opinion clearly raises the possibility
that in the proper case, conflicts principles may be used to suggest congressional intent
not to apply section 10(b).
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ment of all disputes arising under the contract. 2 7 Choice-of-law clauses
generally serve a useful purpose in reducing the uncertainty inherent
in transnational business ventures, and enforcement of these clauses
normally rewards the legitimate expectations of the parties. But agreements to apply another nation's law necessarily involve waiving any
rights which the parties may have under American law, and Congress
explicitly provided in section 29 (a) that compliance with the provisions
of the Exchange Act cannot be waived by contract. 2 s If, then, an
analysis of the principles of international law and of the factors relevant to a determination of Congressional intent produces the conclusion
that rule 10b-5 is applicable to a transaction, an agreement to apply
another nation's law is unenforceable as such in a United States court.
Choice-of-forum clauses, in addition to reducing uncertainty,
serve important purposes of providing a neutral forum and preventing
inconvenience. While American state courts have traditionally displayed hostility to these clauses, the Supreme Court in a recent
admiralty case, The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 2 9 held that
choice-of-forum clauses are prima facie valid. The Court stated that a
forum clause should be enforced unless: (1) the clause was secured
by fraud or overreaching, (2) "enforcement would contravene a strong
public policy of the state in which the suit is brought . . . ," or (3)
the contractual forum would be so inconvenient that one of the parties
30
would "for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court.'
The Zapata standards for enforceability of forum clauses are applicable in suits brought under the federal securities laws.
If choice-of-forum clauses involved no more than the selection of
the site for resolving ,disputes, they might well be enforceable in
actions for fraud. But to the extent that the contractual forum can be
expected to apply its own law, rather than rule 10b-5, enforcement of
the choice-of-forum clause would contravene United States policy in
cases in which rule 10b-5 would be applied by an American courtparticularly in light of section 29(a).'
127 For example, in Leasco the parties agreed that the tender offer was to comply
with the Code on Take-overs and Mergers of the City of London and the regulations
of the London Stock Exchange. 468 F.2d at 1332.
128 Section 29(a) provides:
Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance
with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of
any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void.
15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1970).
129 407 U.S. 1 (1972).

130 Id. at 18.
131 In Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), the Supreme Court held that an agreement to arbitrate future controversies was void under § 14 of the Securities Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77n (1970), which is virtually identical to § 29(a) of the Exchange Act. But
in Alco Standard Corp. v. Benalal, [1972-73 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
ff 93,640 (E.D. Pa. 1972), a case arising under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, a district
court "question[ed] the application of Wilco v. Swan [sic] to a factual situation in
which a strong and sophisticated party chooses his forum in advance . . . . " Id. at
92,892 n.7. The court refused to defer to arbitration on other grounds, but clearly imr-
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b. Expectations of the Parties as an Element in the Jurisdictional
Calculus
While choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses may not be
enforceable as such, it does not necessarily follow that the expectations
of the parties, whether formally expressed in agreements or not, are
entitled to no weight at all in determining the applicability of rule
10b-5. Indeed, section 29(a) bars only the waiver of acknowledged
rights under the Exchange Act. When a provision of the Exchange Act
is applicable, section 29(a) removes the binding effect of any agreement not to assert a claim under that provision. 32 On its face, section
29 (a) does not bar the weighing of the parties' expectations along with
the other factors relevant to a choice-of-law analysis for the purpose of
determining whether or not Congress intended that provision to be
applicable in the first place.
This reading of section 29(a) may strike some as too strained;
the language of section 29(a) can be read as evidencing a congressional intent that the availability of claims under the Exchange Act be
determined without regard to the prior agreements and expectations of
the parties. In the domestic setting, such a broad reading of section
29(a) consists with the broad investor-protection policies of the Exchange Act. But in the transnational setting, the former, narrow
reading of section 29(a) is preferable. 133 Congress gave no more
thought to the applicability of section 29(a) in the transnational
setting than it did to the applicability of section 10(b). If, as this
Comment has suggested with respect to section 10(b), the missing
congressional intent is to be supplied by an examination of the relevance and strength of various factors, the relevance of the parties'
expectations cannot be dismissed simply by a broad reading of section 29 (a).
plied that § 29(a) would not void all arbitration agreements covering matters within
the scope of the Exchange Act. However, the court pointed out that it "[did] not mean
to suggest that even [a strong and sophisticated party] could waive the provisions in
Rule lob-5 in advance." Id.
In a more recent case, Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, Civil No. 72-1158 (7th Cir.,
Aug. 2, 1973), the Seventh Circuit extended the Wilko holding to a cause of action arising
under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act. But the majority in that case consisted of two district judges sitting by designation, and Circuit Judge Stevens issued a dissenting opinion
which argued that § 29(a) does not render all arbitration agreements unenforceable. Id.
at 7.
132 In his dissenting opinion in Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, Civil No. 72-1158, at
7, 12 (7th Cir., Aug. 2, 1973), Judge Stevens, arguing for the enforcement of an arbitration clause, observed that a literal reading of § 29(a) does not render void a plaintiff's
waiver of his right to sue in a federal court, but only "renders void any waiver by a
plaintiff of defendant's obligation to comply with the statute." judge Stevens did acknowledge, however, that the underlying policy of the statute "justifies an expansion of
the coverage of § 29(a) of the 1934 Act beyond its literal meaning." Id. at 13. At any
rate, even if the 2 types of waiver discussed by Judge Stevens are at all distinguishable,
his observation is only relevant to the determination of the proper forum (the enforceability of an arbitration clause); it is not relevant to the question with which we are
dealing-whether a plaintiff can waive the applicability of the Act.
'33C
C. Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, Civil No. 72-1158, at 7 (7th Cir., Aug. 2, 1973)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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In evaluating the significance of the parties' expectations in
determining the applicability of rule 10b-5, it is useful to distinguish
between disputes over fulfillment of the terms of a contract and actions
for fraud. In contract disputes, the agreements and expectations of
the parties with respect to the applicable law are crucial, for the terms
to which the parties agreed may be determined in part by the applicable
law. In such cases, application of the agreed-upon law would be
necessary in order to reward the legitimate expectations of the parties.
There is no comparable expectation or reliance interest in an
action for fraud. First, it is unlikely that parties to a transaction
contemplate what state's law of fraud would be applicable. And
second, even if the parties do expressly agree that a particular law of
'fraud would be applicable, fraud is sufficiently tainted with moral
blame to render any reliance upon such an agreement unworthy of
legal recognition. Indeed, Professor Ehrenzweig says that precisely
because of the moral blame which attaches to fraud, a court in a fraud
action involving foreign elements will always apply its own law, regardless of differing standards of behavior in the 'relevant states." 4
Rule 10b-5, of course, differs substantially from the common law
of fraud: the standards of conduct are significantly higher and the
requirements of proof significantly easier under rule 10b-5.'18 5 The
differences are significant enough that the parties to a transnational
securities venture may well wish to establish at the outset whether or
not rule 10b-5 is applicable. It could be argued that the differences
are more significant than the differences among various states' common laws of fraud that have been disregarded by forum courts in
always applying their own law, and that the reliance interest is therefore greater in the case involving the possible application of rule 10b-5
than in the case involving the application of one or. another state's
common law of fraud. And it could be argued further that since the
moral blame attached to behavior prohibited by rule 10b-5 but not by
common law fraud is less than that attached to behavior which would
be prohibited by any version of common law fraud, the reliance
interest is more worthy of judicial recognition in the case involving
the possible application of rule 10b-5.
These arguments are not without merit, for there is some value
in permitting parties involved in arm's-length negotiations to define
the duties owing to each other, short of dispensing with the fundamental duties of fair dealing which are embodied in a nation's common
law of fraud. 3 ' But the value of rule 10b-5 in promoting sound
134 A. EBRENZWEIG, CoN-FLIcT OF LAWS 558-59 (1962).
135 Rule 10b-5 has gone beyond the common law of fraud in expanding recognition
of nondisclosure and dispensing with the scienter and privity requirements. See generally
1 A. BRomBERo, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 2.7(1) (1971); 2 id. §§ 8.1, 8.5(511).
136 The agreements and expectations of the parties are, of course, only relevant in
disputes between those parties. For example, an agreement that American law would not
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securities markets has been demonstrated in the domestic context, and
any expectation or agreement of the parties that rule lob-5 would
not apply should not predominate over conflicting national or global
policies and interests.
2. Policies and Interests of the United States
a. ProtectingAmerican Investors and American Markets
One source of confusion in the cases discussed above is uncertainty
over whether Congress intended the securities laws to protect American
investors or to protect Anfierican markets or both. It is unlikely that
the drafters of the 1934 Act gave much consideration to the distinction.
As long as Americans invested overwhelmingly in domestic markets
and the domestic markets were overwhelmingly American, the distinction was irrelevant. However, as more Americans invest in foreign
markets and more foreigners invest in American markets, the distinction between protecting American investors and protecting American markets becomes crucial to an assessment of the appropriate transnational applicability of rule 10b-5.
In the absence of congressional clarification of the importance
of each form of protection, the courts themselves must engage in an
evaluation of the United States' interests. While protecting American
investors and protecting the integrity of American markets may no
longer be accomplished in a single stroke, the United States retains an
interest in each. The magnitude of the interest will, of course, vary
from case to case, according to, respectively, the number of American
investors involved and the directness and magnitude of the impact on
American markets.
It was primarily the United States' interest in protecting American
investors which supported jurisdiction in Schoenbaum, and which
argues in favor of jurisdiction in Leasco even in the absence of conduct in the United States. This same interest offers support for extending rule 10b-5 protection to the individual American investor who
buys stock in a foreign market, although the magnitude of the United
States' interest in protecting this individual investor is probably out13 7
weighed by considerations of international harmony.
It is the United States' interest in protecting the integrity of its
securities markets which jusifies the application of rule 10b-5 to proapply to the sale of a controlling interest in a corporation would be of no significance
in a suit brought by an adversely affected minority shareholder. Similarly, in a derivative
suit like Schoenbaum, in which a minority shareholder claims that another shareholder
used its controlling position on the board of directors to sell itself treasury shares for
inadequate consideration, it would be inequitable to place any significance on the expectations or agreements of the board of directors and the purchasing shareholder with
respect to the applicable law.
137 Cf. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334
(2d Cir. 1972) (text accompanying notes 77-78 supra); Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp.
388 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (text accompanying notes 35-41 supra).
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tect a foreign investor defrauded in transacting business in the American markets. This interest in protecting the integrity of American
markets in order to promote the free flow of capital to American
business suggests that rule 10b-5 protection should be extended to
foreign investors who participate indirectly in the domestic securities
markets through offshore
mutual funds-a step which the courts have
38
been hesitant to take.
b.

United States Monetary Policy
United States monetary policy is interwoven with securities
regulation. In 1964, as part of the program to reduce the balance of
payments deficit and protect United States gold reserves, the SEC
relaxed the requirements for the registration of foreign offerings by
domestic issuers in order to encourage foreign investment. 39 Like SEC
relaxation of these registration requirements, court decisions construing the reach of rule 10b-5 will have an effect on the United States'
balance of payments. Should the courts extend anti-fraud protection
to American investors overseas but deny protection to foreign investors
in American securities, this policy would encourage the flow of investment capital from the United States and contribute to our balance of
payments deficit. This is one of the lessons of the Fund of Funds
fiasco which soured many foreigners to American investments. 40
The formulation of monetary policy is not, of course, within the
realm of the courts. The 1964 decision of the SEC to relax registration
requirements came at the recommendation of a Presidential Task
Force. 4' While the courts should be mindful of express monetary
policy and changes in monetary policy, it would be improper for. them
to act unilaterally in this area.
c. ProtectingForeignersWho Transact Business in Foreign Securities
with Other Foreignersin the United States
The United States retains some interest in securities transactions
between foreigners in the United States, even if the transaction does
not touch directly upon any American citizen or domestic market. If
the extension of rule 10b-5 protection to these foreigners would encourage them to transact business in the United States, indirect
benefits would flow to the domestic securities markets and to the
domestic economy in general. In the case of the Japanese and the
German businessmen meeting in New York for convenience to transact
138 See cases discussed in notes 85, 105 supra & accompanying text.
139 Registration of Foreign Offerings by Domestic Issuers, 17 C.F.R. § 231.4708
(1973).
140 See notes 146-48 infra & accompanying text.
1 41
PROMOTMG FoREIGN INVESTMENT, supranote 3, at 7-8.
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business in Japanese securities, these benefits may be de minimis.
But if the Japanese and German businessmen have permanent offices
in New York, the benefits may be of some significance.
3. Policies and Interests of Other Nations
a. InterestsReflected by Differences Between a ForeignNation's Law
and American Law
Accommodation of the interests of the United States and other
nations is not always an easy task, particularly in areas in which these
interests are in direct conflict. For example, the bank secrecy laws of
such nations as Germany and Switzerland can conflict directly with
the disclosure requirements of the United States securities laws' 42 and
with the discovery procedures of American courts. 4 3 Attempts to
enforce American disclosure requirements and subpoenas can place a
German or. Swiss national in a position of obeying United States law
only at the risk of being found guilty of violating his own nation's
law. To a lesser degree, application of American antitrust laws in the
transnational setting can raise similar conflicts. As a matter of basic
economic policy, some nations encourage cartels and other cooperative
arrangements which would constitute violations of the United States'
44
antitrust laws.'
The application of rule 10b-5 to securities transactions which
produce effects within the United States does not involve the same
potential for direct conflict with the policies of foreign nations, for
fraud is widely recognized as a tort. Other nations may set more
lenient standards of conduct and stricter requirements of proof than
are imposed by rule 10b-5, but those standards and requirements do
not call for conduct inconsistent with the conduct called for by rule
10b-5. The application of those standards and requirements may
produce different results than the application of rule 10b-5, but the
differences do not represent any significant policy of the other nations.
Certainly it cannot be said generally that other nations have made
conscious decisions that their national interest is best served by the
imposition of lower standards of conduct and stricter requirements of
proof than those imposed by rule 10b-5. Those nations do not, then,
have strong interests in the application of their own standards rather
than 10b-5 stafndards in cases involving Americans and their own
nationals.
142 See, e.g., Fontaine v. SEC, 259 F. Supp. 880 (D.P.R. 1966).
143 See, e.g., Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales,
SAi. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958); United States v. First National City Bank, 396 F.2d
897 (2d Cir. 1968).
44
1 See H. STEIIWER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 912 (1968); C.
EDWARDS, TRADE REGULATIONS OvERsEAs (1966).
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b.

Interests Reflected by the Existence of a Foreign Nation's Law
Foreign nations have an interest in developing their own regulatory schemes for securities transactions and corporate management.
For example, in Schoenbaum Canada had an interest in regulating the
internal operation of a Canadian corporation-more specifically, the
duties of controlling persons to the corporation and its shareholders.
While the absence of remedies available to the corporation or the
minority shareholders would not imply the existence of any significant
Canadian policy sufficient to bar the application of rule 10b-5, the
existence of such remedies under Canadian law might support an
American court's deferral to Canadian law. But Canada's interest in
having injuries remedied through the application of its own law, rather
than American law, is hardly compelling.
c.

Protecting Nationals from Inconvenience

Foreign nations retain an interest in protecting nationals who do
business with Americans within their own territory from the inconvenience of law suits in the United States. But inconvenience to the
parties is more properly considered in determining whether a United
States court has jurisdiction over the person, and whether a suit
brought in the United States should be dismissed under the principle
of forum non conveniens. Inconvenience has no bearing on the ques-.
tion whether section 10(b) is applicable.
In general, in cases of fraud and other misconduct which may
violate rule 10b-5, the interests and policies of other nations do not
militate strongly against the applicability of United States law. The
transnational applicability of rule 10b-5 should depend primarily upon
the strength of the other factors in our jurisdictional calculus.
4.

The Needs of the International Community

It has been the increased transnational activity in the securities
business that has given rise to the complex jurisdictional questions of
the transnational applicability of section 10(b), and it is with an eye
to facilitating further transnational securities activity that the courts
should approach these jurisdictional questions. The most important
elements in the jurisdictional calculus are the need to promote the
harmonious relations among nations and nationals that are essential
to successful commercial intercourse, 4 5 and more specifically, the
need to promote sound transnational securities markets. While these
needs may occasionally pull the courts in different directions, they both
point to the desirability of uniformly high standards of conduct for
participants in the transnational securities markets. As the nation with
the most sophisticated securities laws, the United States has a re145

See RESTATEM.NT (SECOND)

or CONFLICT Op LAWS

§

6,

Comment d (1971).
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sponsibility to lead the international community toward the development and enforcement of uniformly high standards of conduct, but
of doing so in or spirit of cooperation rather than imposition.
The goals of sound transnational securities markets and harmonious relations among nations require that the umbrella of protection afforded by rule 10b-5 be neither offered every American investor
abroad nor denied every foreign investor in the United States or
abroad. They also 'require that the United States' courts be neither
overzealous in extending rule 10b-5 .protection in cases in which protection is available under some applicable foreign law nor reticent in
extending rule 10b-5 protection in cases in which no adequate alternative protection exists.
The recent collapse of IOS illustrates the harms which can occur
when the SEC and the United States' courts refuse to fill a regulatory
vacuum that works to the detriment of foreign investors. 46 In that
case, the aggressive merchandising techniques which are carefully
regulated in the United States and other countries with sophisticated
securities laws were exported into comparatively undeveloped markets
in which external regulation was limited. The IOS collapse not only
harmed those unfortunate investors who held investments in IOS and
its affiliated enterprises, but also impaired the growing confidence of
many foreign investors in American securities. 47 Some countries responded to the experience with sharply restrictiv; regulation designed
to keep out foreign investment intermediaries. 48
Although the effects of overextension of rule 10b-5 in cases in
which alternative protection is available are not likely to be as dramatic
as the effects of underextension in cases in which no alternatives are
available, such overextension may indirectly deter transnational securities dealings. The prospect of being subject to American securities
laws, and the resultant need to become familiar with these American
laws, may discourage foreigners from entering into transactions with
Americans. And the increased willingness of foreign nations to apply
their laws in the transnational setting-a possible result of extended
application of American law in the transnational setting-may have a
similar effect upon American businessmen and investors. But it is
probably safe to say that the situations in which the availability of
rule 10b-5 protection would discourage transnational securities activity
are far less numerous than those in which the availability of rule
10b-5 protection would encourage such activity. And as for those cases
in which the availability of rule 10b-5 protection would discourage
transnational securities activity, some of this discouragement may be a
146 See generally N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1972, at 63, col. 7.
147 See N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1972, at 49, col. 7.
148 See, e.g., Law Concerning the Distribution of Foreign Investment Shares, 1 FED.
REPuBLic or GERmANY FED. L.J. 986 (1972) (translation on file at Biddle Law Library,
Univ. of Pa.).
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reasonable price to pay for the increased soundness of the transnational
securities markets.
C.

Institutional Considerations: The Locus of Decisionmaking

Courts should attempt to weigh the complex elements involved in
determining the proper reach of rule 10b-5 and the American securities
laws in general, but there should be no illusion that the courts can
succeed unaided. Professors Brainerd Currie and Albert Ehrenzweig
have suggested that the courts are ill-equipped to handle the complex
weighing of competing interests which choice-of-law principles require.'4 9 When speaking of the application of conflicts principles in an
international context, this conclusion is inescapable. The judicial
mechanism is not geared to making national securities policy, balancing the competing policies of different nations, or structuring an international regulatory system.
While the United States courts cannot be expected to do an adequate job of determining the proper transnational reach of rule 10b-5,
it is not immediately apparent what body is best suited to the task. The
SEC can play an important role in clarifying the significance of the
application of rule 10b-5 in different contexts to the goals of protecting
American investors and American securities markets. The SEC has
established an Office of International Corporate Finance, whose duties
include supervising offerings of American securities abroad and offerings of foreign securities in the United States, and resolving the problems arising from the need to meet the accounting and disclosure
requirements of more than one nation.'5 The Office of International
Corporate Finance should address itself to the question of the appropriate transnational reach of rule 10b-5.
The inquiry should not stop with the SEC. Congress has a threefold contribution to make. First, Congress should clarify the extent to
which the securities laws are intended to protect American investors
and the extent to which these laws are intended to protect American
markets. Second, Congress should attempt to clarify the manner in
which the transnational application of rule 10b-5 and other parts of
the securities laws should depend upon other national concerns, such as
United States monetary policy and foreign policy in general. In this
latter endeavor, the Congress should seek input from the executive
branch of government. Third, Congress should address the question of
the proper scope of the American securities laws in light of the
policies and interests of other nations and the international community
as a whole. Congressional hearings drawing upon the expertise of
skilled comparativists in the securities field and representatives of
149 Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE
L.J. 171, 176; A. EMENZWEIG, supra note 134, at 351 n.16 (1962).
150 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9947 (Jan. 11, 1973).
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American and foreign securities industries are necessary and appropriate steps toward the goal of establishing the proper scope of the
American securities laws.
Congress' ability to develop reasonable limitations on the applicability of the securities laws depends largely upon the quality of
the information and advice which it receives from those most familiar
with the problems-the members and the students of the securities
industry. But even among the members and the students of the industry, there is inadequate understanding of the regulatory problems
posed by the transnational character of today's securities industry.
There is a need for cooperative programs which bring together
securities scholars from around the world for the purpose of developing a common understanding of the workings of the various market
systems and an appreciation of the emerging problems. This common
understanding could then be utilized to consider the proper transnational reach of the American securities laws, to resolve the conflicts
generated by the increased integration of the world capital markets,
and eventually to develop a common regulatory scheme which a worldwide securities industry will demand.'5 1 It is only through such cooperative programs that the problems inherent in the present structure
of the securities industry will be resolved.
151 Professor Robert H. Mundheim, the Director of the Center for Study of Financial Institutions at the University of Pennsylvania, has proposed the creation of an
International Faculty with these precise goals in mind.

